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Introduction
Since 1978 a series of agricultural policy reforms were gradually introduced in China in order to shift the agricultural commune system towards a more liberalized agricultural market system. These reforms were mainly aimed at achieving a higher level of aggregate production of major foodgrains and a higher level of productivity of farmers. According to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) 2008 data, China is one of the largest producers of wheat in the world accounting for approximately 17% of the world's wheat production 2 . In this paper we examine if, how and to what extent the incentives introduced through the policy reforms during the period 1978-2007 contributed to the growth in wheat production, to the growth in farmers'productivity, and to farmers'welfare in China. This paper is important for three reasons. First, in this paper we examine how farmers in China react to reforms, where reforms are directed towards providing farmers the incentive to produce and sell wheat more competitively. Based on an analytical framework where we assume that the farmers are pro…t-maximizers and they choose the e¤ort level that is optimal, we empirically examine the farmers'e¤ort-response for the full set of agricultural reforms undertaken in China. We explore this framework in order to study how pro…t maximizing farmers respond to changes in policy and institutions. Second, we examine how reforms a¤ect the growth in the Total Factor Productivity (TFP) of wheat production 3 and the growth in the incentive component of this TFP for a country that has experienced a series of interesting reforms and weather shocks and currently is one of the largest producers of wheat. In doing so we use the most recent available dataset which covers almost a decade following the last important reforms. In this way our study extends important previous studies, such as Zhang and Carter (1997) , Lin (1992) , and McMillan et al. (1989) 4 .
We also extend these works (and others, such as Che et al., 2001 , Kompas, 2005 and Selim and Parvin, 2010 by simulating the e¤ect of policy reforms on the welfare of farmers. Through the welfare analysis, we examine if and to what extent policy reforms have contributed to the improvement of living for the wheat farmers in China, which is the third important contribution of this paper.
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We follow the approach as in Hayami and Ruttan (1985) , which McMillan et al. (1989) , Lin (1992) and Zhang and Carter (1997) explore to study foodgrain productivity growth in China for 1978-84, 1970-87 and 1979-86, respectively 5 . Typically in economies in transition factor price and product price increase at di¤erent rates with market reforms. We characterize this process through a weighted cost-share parameter of wheat production in China, which is the ratio of average factor to product prices. As is true for most economies in transition, the value of such a cost-share parameter falls over time with market reforms which in turns results in higher pro…ts. We assume that farmers are pro…t maximizers, therefore they will choose e¤ort levels that are optimal. We use the farmers'optimal e¤ort function in order to transform a technical wheat production function into a production function that captures the farmers'optimal response to changes in institutions and policy. We estimate the transformed function using panel data of 30 wheat producing regions of China for the period 1997-2006. We use the estimated factor share parameters, other parameters of the model, and time series of aggregate level data of factor and wheat prices for China for the period in order to simulate the time path of TFP and the time path of its incentive component.
This enables us to capture the TFP growth and the growth in the incentive component of this TFP for all policy regimes. In addition, we use the computed parameters to generate a utility index and a time path of optimal e¤ort levels for the entire reform period. Typically, the incentives that are introduced through the reforms result in higher level of e¤ort, which in turns adds to the disutility of wheat farmers. But since farmers like pro…ts, the increase in pro…t (resulting from the higher level of e¤ort) adds to the utility of wheat farmers. The utility level resulting from a particular reform (or a series of reforms) would therefore depend on which e¤ect dominates. We compute the utility index for the entire reform period which enables us to examine how policy reforms a¤ected the welfare of wheat farmers in China.
We …nd that compared to the incentives introduced through the rural reforms in the early eighties, the incentives introduced through the price reforms of the nineties accounted for a greater response from wheat farmers. This response led to higher e¤ort levels in the nineties. However, presumably due to the series of droughts in the early nineties the extended e¤orts did not result in higher pro…ts in wheat production, which is possibly why we …nd that during this phase the farmers su¤ered a large drop in welfare. We …nd a further drop in welfare of farmers following the most recent reform of 1998 when the government took over the control of agricultural prices. Our results also suggest that wheat production in China experienced an increase in TFP immediately following the early stages of reforms, and the main channel of this growth was the incentive component of TFP. By taking over the control of prices in 1998, the government destroyed the growth in the incentive component of TFP. In general we …nd that wheat farmers in China responded positively to reforms that led to more competitive market structure, and their e¤ort-response to the introduction of ‡at subsidies or regulated pricing was very little.
A Brief History of Chinese Agricultural Reforms
We consult four main sources, namely, the various publications of the Ministry of Agriculture of the People's Republic of China (MOA, hereafter), Harrold (1992) , Carter (2003) and Tong et al. (2003) in summarizing the major agricultural policy reforms that were undertaken in China. In 1976 when the communist leader Mao passed away, the new leadership led China into a period of great economic reforms starting with the rural reforms. The rural reforms began by changing the agricultural production system from the commune system to one of the household contract responsibility system in 1978. Under this new system the farmers were given a long term lease on the land that they farmed and instead of transferring all their produce to the government they were allowed to keep some and sell it at market prices to make a pro…t.
The government apparently recognised the need for specialization and the notion of absolute advantage and realized that it would be more e¢ cient to allocate certain crops to speci…c provinces. Harrold (1992) …nds that this reform led to a 25% (average) real increase in relative agricultural prices, which in turns acted as an incentive to produce more 6 . The state monopoly of allocating agricultural land was abolished so that the farmers could set up diversi…ed businesses such as township enterprises. These reforms allowed a greater freedom for the farmers which resulted in their attempt to take advantage of the incentives to produce more with a greater level of e¢ ciency.
As a support towards the …rst step of liberalization, in 1984 the government introduced an increase in price subsidy. In the following year the government left its role as the state monopoly of agricultural trade and established a market based contract structure. In 1986 the government introduced a scheme of increased subsidies to cereal production. During this regime there was also an increase in the chemical fertiliser supply, resulting in an increase in aggregate production levels of crops (see Tong et al., 2003 for details).
The reforms in the nineties were mainly price reforms which together with the aforementioned changes enabled farmers to make many decisions on their own. As the years progressed so did the level of technology, and farmers in China started to adopt the new technology package which enabled further diversi…cation. Research and development into seeds and fertilizer contributed to the increase in production. Apart from the rural reforms, several other policy reforms such as the state owned enterprise reform, social sector reform and the …nancial sector reform undertaken in the late eighties and the early nineties were aimed at providing a sound policy environment towards agricultural growth. The sequence of reforms posed a need for a reform on the prices. The government undertook the two-tier price reform in 1988 and in 1991. The …rst of these reforms a¤ected the non-staple products, while the second a¤ected the grain and the oil seed prices (see Harrold, 1992 for details).
These reforms were aimed at promoting the market based trade of agricultural inputs and output. Prior to these reforms, the government played a major role in determining all the prices of goods and services.
However, in 1998 the government introduced the grain self-su¢ ciency system. Through this reform the government again took over the control of the grain prices. This move by the government altered the incentive structure that were previously introduced. This reform allegedly is a result of a decade of low growth in agricultural production in China, when the growth rate in rice production and wheat production dropped from 4.89% and 7.32% to 1.39% and 2.08%, respectively (see Pingali and Heisey, 2001 for details).
According to the reports of the MOA, the rural reforms led to development in agricultural productivity, rejuvination to the rural economy, improvement in living standards, and a sustained and rapid level of economic development. With the introduction of the grain self-su¢ ciency system in 1998 when the government took over the control of grain prices, the government committed to continue reforms that are aimed at improving the level of agricultural productivity, devising a farmland protection system, promoting agricultural structure readjustment, strengthening the agricultural service system, improving the rural distribution system, intensifying the rural reforms and expanding and opening up China to the rest of the world.
Apart from the policy reforms which created impacts on agricultural production and productivity, certain environmental shocks and global political as well as economic events are often alleged to have a¤ected agricultural production in China. The Asian …nancial crisis caused a deceleration of the Chinese economy. This crisis happened just before the grain self-su¢ ciency system was introduced. China joined the World Trade Organization 1991, 1992, 1994, 1997 and 2006 , and the snowstorm and earthquake in 2008, which are held partly responsible for not only the contemporaneous loss in agricultural output but also for adverse long term e¤ects on the conditions of agricultural land and infrastructure.
In this paper we mainly focus on the hypothesis that the main reason of the changes in agricultural productivity in China is the changes in the incentive structures that were introduced through the policy reforms. We consider three stages of agricultural policy reforms, namely, (1) the rural reforms 1979-1984, when agricultural markets were partly liberalized (the partly liberalized regime), (2) the rural reforms 1985-1997, when agricultural markets were fully liberalized (the liberalized regime), and (3) the rural reforms 1998-2007, when the state took over the control of agricultural prices (the grain self-su¢ ciency regime).
Our empirical methodology enables us to characterize the changes in the incentive structures that were introduced through these three regimes and their resulting impact on the TFP of wheat production. In order to account for the incentive-induced changes in productivity we decompose TFP of wheat production into an incentive component and an other component.
While our key focus will be on the incentive component of TFP, the other component of TFP is assumed to account for exogenous random shock-induced changes in TFP of wheat production.
The Analytical Model
We assume that the production of wheat requires four inputs: e¤ective contribution of labour, e¤ective use of machinery power, land, and the total amount of fertilizers. Let " N denote the level of e¤ort of a typical farmer so that in a model with N farmers, " N N is the e¤ective contribution of farmers'working time measured in e¢ ciency units 7 . Since managing the use of machinery power is a major source of concern for a typical farmer, we capture the management of machinery power through another e¤ort variable, denoted by " M , i.e. if M denotes the total power of the machinery used in wheat production, " M captures the e¤ort associated with exploiting and managing the machinery power 8 . Measured in e¢ ciency units, the total input of machinery power in wheat production is therefore " M M .
With a 0 2 (0; 1) and a i 2 [0; 1] ; i = 1; 2; 3; 4, such that 4 P i=1 a i = 1, the technical constant returns to scale (CRTS) production function for wheat is:
( 1) where Q denotes the total output of wheat, L denotes the sown area of wheat, and F denotes the total amount of fertilizer used in wheat production. In per capita terms, the production function is
Let p denote the market price of wheat, and ! i ; i = 1; 2; 3; 4, denote the price of input i. Farmers choose the least cost combination of inputs. The total cost function, with > 0 (a constant) is given by:
With the average real input price
i , the cost of production per farmer is:
p , which is the ratio of the observed average input to output prices. The farmer's pro…t function is:
Farmers utility is de…ned over pro…ts and the e¤ort levels. They like the pro…ts but dislike the e¤ort of hard work and the e¤ort of planning more e¢ cient use of the machinery power. Their utility function is:
with 2 (0; 1) and 2 (0; 1) 9 . With (2) and (5), we can write the farmers' utility maximization problem as:
9 With (6), the marginal utility of pro…t is constant and the marginal disutility of e¤ort is increasing in the level of e¤ort. Without loss of generality we assume that the parameter in (6) is identical across both types of e¤ort.
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The optimal values of e¤ort levels satisfy
where 1 1 (a 1 +a 2 ) .
Proposition 1
The optimal e¤ ort level in work is a …xed proportion of the optimal e¤ ort level in planning the use of machinery power.
Proof. Consider (8) and (9) which together imply
and therefore
and the …xed proportion depends on a 1 ; a 2 and .
The optimal levels of e¤ort given by (8) and (9) depend on, among others, the output and input prices. In transition economies, prices of inputs and the price of output generally increase at di¤erent rates with reforms. This process is characterized by the share-cost parameter . Any change in this parameter will a¤ect the farmers'optimal e¤ort-response.
Thus any change in policy and institutions that alters the price of agricultural inputs and/or the market price for wheat is captured by the change in the level of e¤ort by a typical farmer.
Together with the changes in output and inputs prices which alter the pro…ts of a typical farmer, changes in the optimal e¤ort level thus guide the change in TFP and the change in utility.
We substitute (8) in (1) in order to derive the institutional production function, i.e.
the production function that captures farmers'optimal response to changes in market and institutions:
where the total factor productivity (TFP) coe¢ cient A is given by:
7 and the share parameters in (12) are
for working time, machinery power, land and fertilizers, respectively. The institutional production function (12) optimal response to changes in policy and institutions. With obervable data we estimate the institutional production function, (12).
The TFP coe¢ cient in (13) can now be decomposed into two components, which are:
and
In this way, the institutional production function assists in explaining the incentive induced growth in TFP. More speci…cally, A inc is the incentive component of TFP in wheat production, i.e. the component that changes due to changes in output and input prices, and A other is the unexplained component of TFP, and clearly,
Data and Estimation
In this paper we estimate (12) using panel data for thirty regions of China over the The data that are available from these sources, both for the regional and the national aggregate level, include output of wheat as the total wheat production measured on an annual basis in 1000 tons. The total area of cultivated land and sown area for wheat are both in 1000 hectares. Agricultural employment is in millions 11 . The machinery data is the total power of agricultural machinery (in 10000 kw) used in farming, forestry, animal husbandry, and …shery, including ploughing, irrigation and drainage, harvesting, transport, plant protection and stock breeding. Fertilizer data is the quantity of chemical fertilizer (in 10000 tons for regional data) applied in agriculture during the year, including nitrogenous fertilizer, phosphate fertilizer, potash fertilizer, and compound fertilizer. We convert the data in per hectare form, i.e. we …rst compute the proportion of total cultivated land that is cultivated for wheat production. We use this proportion to derive output of wheat per hectare, power of machinery used per hectare and chemical fertilizer used per hectare.
The labour data is taken in the form of person days per hectare. This is calculated by multiplying the labour force by the ratio of the total sown area of wheat and the total area of cultivated land, and then dividing the result by three hundred (the approximate number of working days in one year).
1 0 The input and output data for wheat production is collected from the Department of Rural, Social and Economic Survey. The input and output price data are collected from the Department of Urban, Social and Economic Survey.
1 1 This agricultural labour force refers to the total labourers who are directly engaged in farming and receive remuneration payment or earn business income in the farming sector. For regional level data the agricultural employment is in 10000 persons.
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The input price and output price data that we use are the national level averages. The price of wheat is taken from the USDA. This price data is the producers' price index for wheat computed using a geometric mean approach. Because farmers in China are required to pay an agricultural tax for land use, we use the (per hectare) revenue collected from this tax as a proxy for land rental. The wage data is the average wage of agricultural workers, in money terms per person over one year. The price for farm machinery and the price for chemical fertilizer are collected from Statistical Yearbook of CBNS. We collect net income per capita which is the total income of the permanent residents of the rural households during a year after the deduction of the expenses for productive and non-productive business operation, the payment for taxes and the payment for collective units for their contracted tasks. This net income data is our proxy for net pro…ts of farmers. This data is required in order to pin down the parameter using (5). For the simulations we convert all price data and the net pro…t data into indices with 1978 as the base year.
Estimation, diagnostic tests and computations
We estimate (12) using many combinations of cross section and period e¤ects. These combinations are to account for the unobserved e¤ect within a panel and the idiosyncratic errors in the model. Typically, assuming …xed e¤ects within a panel estimation is equivalent to imposing time independent e¤ects for each entity that are possibly correlated with the regressors. On the other hand, the random e¤ects assumption is that the individual speci…c e¤ects are uncorrelated with the regressors. We conduct a series of diagnostic tests for misspeci…cation, the redundancy of the …xed e¤ects, and the consistency of the random e¤ects (where applicable). We present a summary of the estimated models and the main tests in table 3 (in appendix) 12 .
In table 3, model 1 is estimated using simple OLS with no cross section and period e¤ects. Models 2, 3 and 9 are estimated with the assumption of cross section …xed e¤ects, and models 4, 5 and 8 are estimated with the assumption of cross section random e¤ects.
Models 5, 7 and 9 are estimated assuming that period e¤ects are random, while models 3, 6 and 8 are estimated assuming that they are …xed. The RESET tests for each model suggest misspeci…cation in models 2, 4, 5, 8 and 10. The cross section …xed e¤ects are found to be individually signi…cant for models 2 and 9, while period …xed e¤ects are found individually signi…cant in models 6 and 8. For model 3 the cross section and period …xed e¤ects are found to be jointly as well as individually signi…cant. We …nd inconsistent random cross 1 2 In table 4 and table 6 we present summary of some important individual diagnostic tests. section e¤ects in model 4 and 8, but for model 9 we …nd that the random period e¤ects are consistent.
The wald test for the constant returns to scale in the production technology suggest that for 7 out of 10 speci…cations the CRTS assumption holds. We reject the CRTS assumption for speci…cations 1, 6, and 7. Summary of this test is in table 4. The coe¢ cient estimates are generally statistically signi…cant. We …nd signi…cant negative marginal product of labour in speci…cations 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 10 . As it appears from the estimations, the coe¢ cient estimates for land and machinery are the largest and these estimates are statistcially signi…cant for all speci…cations except 2 and 4. Based on these estimates, we use (14) Based on the diagnostic tests, we choose two representative models, model 3 (one with …xed cross section and …xed period e¤ects) and model 9 (one with …xed cross section and random period e¤ects). The test summary for model selection which is primarily based on the signi…cance of the …xed and random e¤ects is in table 6. For both model 3 and model 9 the RESET test suggest no misspeci…cation, and for both models the adjusted R 2 is very high relative to the others (the Akaike Information Criterion for model 3 is the lowest). For model 3 the cross section and period …xed e¤ects are signi…cant, while for model 9 the cross section …xed e¤ects are signi…cant and the random period e¤ects are consistent 13 .
We use the estimated s of model 3 and model 9, the constant returns to scale assumption, and (14) in order to pin down two sets of estimates for a i 2 [0; 1] ; i = 1; 2; 3; 4, and . We then use these pinned down values, the index for inputs and output prices, and (15) in order to simulate the time path of A inc for the two models. The time path for A is computed using standard growth accounting approach, where A is the standard Solow residual equivalent. Using (17) we then simulate a path for A other . We …x = 1 and use (16) in order to compute a series of a 0 . In principle, the parameter a 0 should not vary over time but the method we use to identify its value in this computation results in a series for this parameter. The computed value for this parameter is essential for computing a series for the optimal e¤ort levels, which in turns will be used to compute a series of welfare levels.
As is clear from (8), (9) and (6), any variation in the optimal e¤ort levels and the level of (optimum) welfare over time is due to variations in input use and variations in input and output prices (and not a 0 ). We therefore compute the simple arithmetic average of the parameter a 0 from the series we generate, which we hold as its pinned down value 14 . These values are 1:49 for model 3 and 0:46 for model 9, both of which are reported in table 5.
These computations enable us to explore (8) and (9) in order to simulate the series of optimal e¤ort levels " N and " M . Finally, using the simulated optimal e¤ort levels, the pinned down parameter values, and the index for input and output prices we simulate a time path of the utility index (for both models). This enables us to examine the changes in welfare due to policy reforms. Given the anaytical model, any policy reform that alters the prices of inputs and output has two channels of a¤ecting the welfare level: the enhanced incentives to earn higher pro…ts (which adds to welfare), and the incentive to exert more e¤ort to earn higher pro…ts (which reduces welfare). Improvement in welfare due to a particular policy reform thus will depend on which of these two e¤ects dominate. Intuitively, if the particular reform brings in a relatively higher rate of increase in the price of output it will a¤ect both the pro…ts and the optimal e¤ort levels. Unless the net e¤ect is numerically characterized, it is not possible to say if that reform will add anything to farmers'welfare.
Results and analysis
In …gures 2a and 3a, we present the simulated path of A and the simulated path of A inc and the path of their growth rates, respectively, that are computed using the estimated parameters for model 3. In …gures 2b and 3b, we do the same for A and A inc and their growth rates using the estimated parameters for model 9.
As in …gure 3a, it appears that the policy reforms of 1978, 1984, 1985, 1991 and 1998 have had an immediate e¤ect on the growth of the incentive component of TFP of wheat production. This immediate e¤ect mimics the variation in the growth in TFP, but prior to the price reforms of the nineties it generally ‡attened out following the reform. For model 3 where we assume …xed cross section and period e¤ects, we …nd a high growth in the incentive component following the introduction of the rural reform (the introduction of the partly liberalized regime in 1978), after which its growth rate drops to zero until the next major reform. In 1984 with the introduction of increased price subsidy, the incentive component has a positive growth, followed by another positive growth rate during 1993-1995 which was part of the second regime (the liberalized regime). This positive growth in the incentive component of TFP is following the introduction of the two-tier pricing of agricultural output.
The incentive component of TFP shows zero growth following the introduction of grain selfsu¢ ciency regime (i.e. when the government took over the control over prices). Once the random period e¤ects are taken into account, as in …gure 3b, together with the …xed cross section e¤ect the growth in the incentive component of TFP shows considerable amount of variation during the …rst two regimes (except the period 1986-1991), and zero growth in the most recent regulated regime.
In both 2a and 2b, the incentive component of TFP has a sharp increasing trend until 1997, showing that wheat farmers in China in general respond to incentives that are introduced through the policy reforms. The trend ‡attens out following the most recent major reform in 1998, which is recon…rmed from the zero growth rate in this component (as in …gures 3a and 3b). The growth in this component is very minimal in the most recent regime, indicating that with the introduction of the grain self-su¢ ciency regime the government has destroyed the incentive-induced growth in TFP. This is clearly shown in the declining trend of the TFP series, as in …gures 2a and 2b.
These results suggest that until 1997 the main channel of growth in TFP of wheat production in China was the incentives that were introduced during the …rst two regimes.
This …nding is similar to the …ndings in Lin (1992) and Harrold (1992) which examine the productivity growth during the …rst phase of rural reforms. Simulations from model 9 (with period random e¤ects and cross section …xed e¤ects) suggest that the growth in the incentive component of TFP was reasonably high during 1993-1997. What apparently killed the growth in the incentive component of the TFP is the government's decision to take over the control on input and output prices, and even an increase in openness (when China joined WTO in 2001) which imposed a higher demand for Chinese wheat failed to generate enough incentives for wheat farmers.
We also …nd very little growth in the incentive component of TFP during 1986 TFP during -1991 period which is a part of the liberalized regime. This shows that the ‡at subsidies which were introduced in 1986 were rather ine¤ective in generating incentives to produce more.
The positive growth in the incentive component of TFP in the early nineties were mainly due to the price reforms, which in turns imply that in China price reforms and liberalization of agricultural markets in general are more e¤ective than ‡at subsidies or state regulations in generating incentives for farmers to produce more.
Reforms and changes in welfare 13
The simulated welfare index and its growth for 1978-2007 are presented in …gures 4 and 6.
The simulated optimal e¤ort levels for the same time period are in …gures 5 and 7. The welfare indices are simple computations of the utility as de…ned by (6) using the computed pro…t index, pinned down parameter values (including = 1) and the optimal e¤ort levels for .
As it appears, wheat farmers'optimal e¤ort levels experienced a boost with the introduction of the price reforms of the early nineties. Prior to that the optimal e¤ort levels are increasing following the introduction of increased price subsidy, but the boost in the early nineties suggest that farmers exert more e¤ort under a deregulated price structure. When the state controls on price were re-established in 1998, optimal e¤ort levels su¤er a decline. The trend in optimal e¤ort level is similar for both model 3 and model 9.
With increased level of e¤ort, welfare starts to drop sharply from the early nineties and continues to drop until the state control over prices was re-established. This reform is followed by a temporary increase in welfare until 2000, after which it drops again. Our computations show that until the two tier pricing reform was undertaken, farmers welfare was more or less stable with its growth moving around a zero mean. This was the period when the government introduced increased price subsidy (in 1984) and a scheme of subsidies to cereal production (in 1986) . This in turns imply that the introduction of ‡at subsidies during the eighties actually did very little in improving farmers' welfare, and the farmers actually responded more when pricing reforms were introduced and markets were further deregulated.
Concluding Remarks
Many important studies which were undertaken before 1998 (e.g. Halbrendt and Gempesaw, 1990 , Harrold, 1992 and Lin, 1992 report that the agricultural reforms in China that were introduced until 1991 have performed their aim of generating rapid economic growth on the basis of e¢ ciency gains. Harrold (1992) for instance …nds that the subsidies introduced in 1984 resulted in a 13.1% growth in gross output value and 6.8% growth in agricultural output, which at the start of the rural reform were 10.7% and 6%, respectively. In the same study Harrold (1992) reports that due to these reforms there was an overall increase in welfare which in turns resulted in a decline in rural poverty levels. But China has su¤ered a major decline in the annual growth rate of wheat production following the …rst phase of rural reforms. While the average growth rate of wheat production was 7.32% for the decade 1978-1987, the same for the decade 1988-1997 was only 2.08% (see Pingali and Heisey, 2001 for details). Allegedly, this low growth rate in wheat production motivated the government to take back the control over agricultural prices.
In this study, we examine the most recent agricultural reforms in China at tandem with the …rst two phases of rural reforms. This enables us to clearly identify which reforms did exactly what. Our results suggest that neither the rural reforms of 1978 nor the eighties' introduction of ‡at subsidies generated enough incentives for farmers to increase e¤ort in production. Neither of these reforms were associated with major changes in farmers' welfare. It was the price reforms of the early nineties (eventually leading the market towards greater degree of liberalization) that provided enough incentives to exert more e¤ort towards achieveing a higher level of productivity in wheat production. Higher e¤ort levels in this period apparently resulted in a lower level of welfare because the resulting pro…ts were not high enough to o¤set the adverse e¤ect of e¤ort on farmers'utility. This is where we …nd the importance of the role weather shocks (the series of droughts of the early nineties) and the Asian …nancial crisis played in reducing farmers' pro…ts. The positive impact of the pricing reform was therefore overshadowed by random shocks to the economy.
We …nd some welfare improvement which immediately followed the re-introduction of state control over agricultural prices. Overall the series of agricultural reforms introduced in China in the nineties shows to have had the most important impact on wheat farmers' productivity and welfare. These …ndings imply that the future agricultural reforms in China need to focus on their potential impact on the welfare of farmers, something which can be achieved through the introduction of a more deregulated market structure where the government would have minimum control over the pricing of agricultural inputs and output. $ CS and P refers to cross section and period …xed e¤ects signi…cance, respectively, based on Fixed e¤ects redundancy test.
$ CS and P refers to cross section and period random e¤ects, respectively, based on Correlated Random e¤ects test. Null hypothesis is constant returns to scale, i.e. 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 1. 
